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BILLS AND NOTES
THE AFTERMATH OF A FORGERY UNDER ARTICLES
THREE AND FOUR
Two recent cases involving negotiable instruments have raised several
questions concerning the Uniform Commercial Code's' treatment of forgery.
Where the forger can be found and is solvent, there is no doubt as to who
will bear the loss; the forger will make restitution. All too often, however,
the courts must place the loss on one of the several innocent parties who
dealt with the instrument and such a task usually presents complex problems
of statutory interpretation.
In Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank,2
 a church employee forged several checks
over a thirteen-month period. The church brought this action against the
drawee bank seeking to recover the value of the many forged checks which
had been paid out of its account. The court rejected defendant's contention
that the church had been negligent in supervising the employee and that it
should have thus been precluded from asserting the forgeries. It held that
the bank had been negligent in not examining the signatures on the checks and
that under sections 4-406(3) and 3-406, the bank would have been liable even
if plaintiff had been negligent. In order to demonstrate that the result in the
instant case is correct, the following analysis of the relevant Code sections is
necessary.
The bank's principal contention was that it had exercised due care and
that the officials of the church had been negligent in failing to examine the
monthly statements . 3 The bank argued that if they had done so, the first
forgeries would have been detected, and the forger could have been stopped
at that point. The bank contended further that, in order to fulfill the duty
of care imposed by section 4-406, the church officials should have periodically
demanded an accounting from the employee. The court found, however, that
when the church had done so, the employee had made plausible excuses and,
in view of his reputation and his twenty-year record of faithful service,
the fact that the church had accepted these excuses did not constitute negli-
gence. It is important to note that the fourteen-day period of subsection
(3) (b) does not purport to establish a maximum reasonable time for examina-
tion; it does not establish negligence as a matter of law. If a customer is in
fact negligent, this is simply the longest period of time that a bank can be held
liable for the subsequent payment of items forged by the same wrongdoer.
In the instant case, then, since the church was not negligent, the fourteen-day
period was never in issue, and it was thus no bar to the church's recovery
that the forgeries had occurred over a thirteen-month period. 4
1
 All citations to the Code are to the 1962 Official Text.
2
 403 S.W.2d 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).
3 	§ 4-406.
4
 Actually, not all the forgeries were governed by the Code, which became effective
only two months before the last forgery. This explains why the court did not mention
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The rules of section 4-406 properly protect a drawee bank and its cus-
tomer by placing the loss on the party who was in the best position to prevent
the forger from succeeding. If the customer was not negligent in providing
the opportunity for the forgeries, then it is unlikely that he will be aware of
them before receiving his statements. The drawee bank has a duty to know
the signature of its customer, 5
 and, therefore, it normally has a signature
card on file. Given these facts, it is generally the drawee who is in the best
position to detect the forgery, and, if it pays the forged instrument, it will
rightly suffer the loss. After he receives his statement, however, the customer
is in the best position to prevent further forgeries. If he fails to do so, it is
not uneasonable that the loss should be shifted to him. It is apparent then
that this shifting of the liability is designed to comport with the commercial
realities of these transactions.
Although the instant case was concerned primarily with section 4-406, it
is clear that the question of a drawer's potential negligence cannot be ade-
quately discussed without reference to at least one other section, namely
section 3-406.8 This section penalizes the drawer's negligence in permitting
the forgery to occur as opposed to the penalty of section 4-406 for failure to
detect the first forgery. This provision is like section 4-406, however, in that
its effect is to preclude a negligent drawer from asserting a forgery of his
signature. An examination of the Code reveals that the operation of this
section is closely related to sections 3-401 and -404. Under section 3-401,
"no person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon."
Under section 3-404, moreover, an unauthorized signature is "wholly inopera-
tive as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is
precluded from denying it . . . ." Although it would appear that the named
drawer of a forged instrument can escape liability under these sections,
it is not quite that simple. Under section 3-307(1), each signature on an
instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings, and, under
section 3-406, a negligent drawer will be precluded from such a denial.
According to section 3-307(2), then, the holder would be entitled to recover
on the check unless another defense could be established.
The key words in section 3-406 are ". . . who by his negligence sub-
stantially contributes . . . ." It is submitted that this provision operates as
the statute of limitations imposed by U.C.C. § 4-406(4). If the Code had been in effect
during the entire period, this statute. of limitations would have prevented the church
from bringing an action as to at least some of the checks.
6 Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 87 (K.B. 1762). See U.C.C. § 3-417,
Comment 4.
0 That section states:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material
alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is
precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against a holder in
due course or against a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in good
faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's
or payor's business.
This section adopts the doctrine of Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P.
1827). That case held that a drawer who so negligently draws an instrument as to
facilitate its material alteration is liable to a drawee who pays the instrument in good
faith.
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an important proximate cause test; not only must negligence be shown, but
it must be the cause of the loss. An excellent example of proximate causation
in a forgery context is First Pa. Banking & Trust Co. v. Montgomery County
Bank & Trust Co., 7
 in which the drawee paid some checks upon presentment
by defendant collecting bank, even though its customer did not have suffi-
cient funds to cover them. When the drawee found that the indorsements on
the checks had been forged, it tried to recover from the collecting bank, claim-
ing a breach of the warranty that all indorsements were genuine. 8 The court
held that even though there was a forgery, the drawee could not prevail. It
stated that the lioss had occurred not because of a breach of warranty, but
because the drawee had honored checks of a depositor who had insufficient
funds. Even if the signatures had been genuine, the drawee would have still
suffered the loss. Similarly, the protection of section 3-406 can be claimed
only by a drawee who has paid the instrument in good faith and has generally
acted in accordance with the reasonable standards of its business.° This
requirement coincides with section 4-406(3), which provides that even if a
drawer was negligent in not discovering a forgery, the drawee cannot charge
its customer's account if it too was negligent.
In the Jackson case, then, if plaintiff had been negligent, the defendant
bank's standard of conduct would have been an issue of decisive significance,
and, although the finding was unnecescary to reach the result, the court here
stated that the bank had been negligent in not examining the checks to deter-
mine the genuineness of the drawer's signature. 1 ' In reaching this conclusion,
the court was careful to point out that many of the checks bore the indorse-
ments of a racetrack. It was the subsequent negligence of the bank which
allowed payment of the forged instrument and was the proximate cause of
the loss. Even if both parties had been negligent in the instant case, the
result would have been no different. The .bank could have prevailed only if
the church had been negligent in some way and if the bank had at the same
time been free of any negligence. If, for example, the church's treatment of
its statements was held to be negligent, then the bank, as drawee, would not
have been liable for checks paid after the statements carrying the first item
bad been available to the church for a reasonable period not exceeding four-
teen days. 11 Subsection (2) (a) of section 4-406 provides, however, that
the burden of proof is on the bank to show a loss resulting from the negligence
of its customer, but, where there is a series of forgeries, "the depositor's
failure to give timely notice is presumed to have caused the loss since otherwise
the wrongdoer could not have successfully repeated the act." 12
Three general patterns thus emerge, regardless of the form taken by any
negligence involved. In the ordinary situation where there is no negligence,
the drawee bears the loss resulting from a forgery, since under sections 3-401
7
 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 596 (Montgomery County Ct. 1962).
8 U.C.C. § 4-207(1)(a).
9 U.C.C. § 3-406, Comment 6.
78
 Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 2, at 113-14.
11 U.C.C.	 4-406(2).
12 O'Malley, The Uniform Commercial Code and Banker's Blanket Bond Losses,
33 Ins. Counsel J. 77, 78 (1966).
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and -404 the drawer cannot be held liable on an instrument which he has not
signed. If both parties are negligent, it is still the drawee who must bear
the loss, since the negligence of the drawer is not deemed sufficiently causa-
tive to warrant a reversal of the ordinary situation. Where, however, it is only
the drawer who is negligent, he is denied the protection of sections 3-401 and
-404. Since it was he who caused the loss, it is only reasonable that he should
not recover from the innocent drawee.
There is another complex forgery problem which requires examination
even though it was not raised in Jackson. Where the drawee has taken a
worthless check, and its customer's negligence has in some manner contributed
to the success of the forgery, an important question is whether the bank can
sue one of the innocent intermediary parties and shift the loss from its negli-
gent customer. If the drawee properly charges the customer's account, as did
the drawee in Jackson, then it will be necessary for the customer to bring
an action against the bank to have the debited amount restored. For one
reason or another, however, notably customer relations, a drawee might fail
to charge the account, accede to the customer's request to restore the funds,
or fail in litigation to assert a valid defense to the drawer's action. Obviously
the drawee bank does not intend to suffer the loss, and if it does any of the
above, it will seek to recover from another party on the warranties given
it under sections 3-417 and 4-207. If the customer's negligence is a breach of
the duty imposed by section 4-406 to check his bank statements, it is clear
that no such shift of liability is possible. Section 4-406(5) provides that a
drawee bank which has a valid defense to a customer's claim must assert
that defense or it cannot bring an action upon the unauthorized signature or
alteration which gave rise to the customer's claim. This simply means that a
drawee bank cannot protect its negligent customer at the expense of some
innocent party by suing upon its warranty rights. If, however, the customer's
negligence is a breach of the general duty of due care under section 3-406,
there is no express prohibition of such a suit by the drawee bank. Such an
inconsistency demands analysis. One writer, after tracing the drafting history
of the Code, suggested that the draftsmen did not intend to limit this prohibi-
tion to section 4-406, and that its omission from section 3-406 was probably
"inadvertent."la Comment 7 to section 4-406 clearly indicates, however, that
the omission was by no means inadvertent. The comment states that "no
present need is known to give the rule wider effect." This comment does not,
however, reconcile the inconsistency noted above. The question remains
whether such an anti-waiver provision should be drawn to apply to section
3-406. Conversely, of course, it must be obvious that the inconsistency would
be removed equally well by eliminating the provision from section 4 -406.
The question thus becomes the broader one of whether such a provision has
any place in the Code at all and, if so, what is its proper scope and breadth.
At the outset, it must be made clear that such an anti-waiver provision
affects only a drawee bank. A collecting bank or other holder is obviously
in no position to attempt to shift the loss in this fashion. The question is fur-
13 Farnsworth, A General Survey of Article 3 and an Examination of Two Aspects
of Codification, 44 Texas L. Rev. 645, 660 (1966).
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ther delimited by the fact that any cause of action which would be prohibited
by an anti-waiver provision is based upon the warranty sections of the Code."
Within these sections there is a major division which must be acknowledged.
All the warranty rights of a drawee bank are given by subsection (I). The
warranties of subsection (2) are not involved in any way; they are not
affected by an anti-waiver provision. These subsection (2) warranties protect
intermediary parties who have come into contact with the check in the course
of negotiation. The Code protects these parties by setting up a chain of
liability which renders each prior holder liable to his transferee and to sub-
sequent holders. Conversely, of course, each transferee acquires warranty
rights against all prior transferors. In order to understand why subsection
(2) warranties do not inure to the benefit of a drawee, it is necessary to exam-
ine the effect of one of the most important policies underlying Articles 3
and 4 of the Code—the free negotiability of commercial paper." As to inter-
mediary parties, such as collecting banks, free negotiability is fostered by
providing maximum protection to the transferee, that is by permitting it to
sue all prior parties. An intermediary party such as a collecting bank has
little opportunity to ascertain the likelihood of sucessfully recovering the
moneys paid out on the thousands of negotiable instruments it handles
each day. Even if these parties had such an opportunity, it would be
commercially impossible for many of them to take advantage of it without
seriously congesting the orderly flow of commercial paper." Given the
exigencies of the above situation, the sweeping protection of subsection (2)
is inescapably necessary to induce these parties to abandon what would other-
wise be their understandable reluctance to take a great many instruments.
As to the drawee, however, the policy of promoting free negotiability is not
in jeopardy. The drawee has one significant advantage which removes the
need for the broad protection of subsection (2): it is never compelled to pay
out any of its own funds in taking an instrument. The customer's money is
already on deposit and the drawee can protect itself simply by debiting the
drawer's account immediately. Consequently, there is no need to encourage
the drawee to accept the instrument. The uncertainty faced by the other
takers is simply not present, and thus the warranties which are designed to
overcome this uncertainty need not be implemented. In sum, then, it has been
demonstrated that the anti-waiver provision can affect only a drawee bank
and that since the drawee bank receives no subsection (2) warranties, the
anti-waiver provision is limited in its application to the subsection (1) war-
ranties of the drawee bank.
The principal reason for the existence of any anti-waiver provision—
even in this limited area—is the operation of another important Code policy.
The Code seeks, wherever possible, to discourage multiplicity and circuity
U.C.C. §§ 3-417 and 4-207. For the purposes of this comment these sections are
identical. In the following discussion, then, no distinction is made, and a reference to
subsection (1) (b), for example, covers both §§ 3-417(1) (b) and 4-207(1) (b).
16 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-112, -118, Comment 1, -201, Comment 3, -203, -207, -305,
-307, Comment 1, -501, Comment 1, -504, Comment 1.
16 See U.C.C. § 3-206, Comment 3.
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of litigation.17
 In the case of a collecting bank or other intermediary, this
policy has had to be submerged in favor of the paramount interest in the
free negotiability of commercial paper. In the case of the drawee bank dis-
cussed above, however, this paramount policy is satisfied without the infusion
of artificial stimuli such as subsection (2) warranties. In this situation, then,
the second policy becomes dominant and the anti-waiver provision is imposed
largely to diminish the number of potential litigations. The policy thus imple-
mented by the anti-waiver provision has two aspects, either of which could
alone justify its existence. The first of these recognizes the basic equities of
the situation; it is designed to eliminate the harrassment of innocent parties
when it is clear that the loss ought to be borne by the negligent drawer. The
second aspect of this policy is a salutary concern for judicial administration.
What will be done in two or three lawsuits ought to be done, if possible, in
one. These policy considerations manifest themselves within subsection (1),
as the anti-waiver provision operates to limit even these warranties. In order
to fully understand the implications of these limitations, it is necessary to
examine the anti-waiver provision as it operates upon each of the drawee's
rights under subsection (1).
Under subsection (I) (a), a party who obtains payment or acceptance
warrants that it has good title, and, if there has been a forged indorsement,
it is in breach of this warranty.18 Normally, then, the drawee has an action
against any party who has transferred the instrument after the forged indorse-
ment. The rationale underlying this warranty right is that a drawee acting
with reasonable care cannot ascertain the genuineness of prior indorsements;
therefore it is entitled to protection. 19 Where, however, the drawee's customer
has been negligent in examining his bank statements, the drawee will be
prohibited by the anti-waiver provision 20 from asserting its subsection (1) (a)
warranties against these prior transferors. Under subsection (I) (c), the
prior transferors warrant that the instrument has not been materially altered.
If the drawer is again negligent as above, the drawee will similarly be
prevented from asserting his rights under this warranty. The application of
the anti-waiver provision to both the above warranties clearly produces a
good result. The drawee should charge the customer's account, and he will
thus have no need to sue these prior parties. 21 Subsection (1) (b), which
deals with the forgery of the drawer's signature, presents a somewhat different
warranty. It provides that the drawee cannot recover from any party unless
that party "had knowledge" that the signature was unauthorized. There are
several reasons given for the drawee's limited remedy under this subsection. 22
17 E.g., U.C.C. I 4-207, Comment 2.
18 Spanogle, The Bank Depositor Relationship—A Comparison of the Present
Tennessee Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 79, 92 (1962),
reprinted in 80 Banking L.J. 943, 958 (1963).
10 U.C.C. 3-417, Comment 3.
20 U.C.C. § 4-406(5).
21 See p. 96 supra.
22 The section is based upon Price v. Neal, supra note 5. See Ames, The Doctrine of
Price v. Neal, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1891); Britton, Defenses, Claims of Ownership and
Equities—A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Law with
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The most persuasive reason is that the drawee is in the best position to dis-
cover a forgery of a drawer's signature ; 25 thus, there is no compelling reason
for him to be protected. Because of the unique limitations of this particular
warranty, there is good cause to doubt whether the anti-waiver provision
should be applied to it at all. Since the section is limited on its face to those
parties who "had knowledge," any need for the anti-waiver provision is
eliminated. Any legitimate purpose of such an anti-waiver provision has
already been served by the fact that the section does not apply to parties who
have acted in good faith. As presently drafted, however, the anti-waiver
provision of section 4-406(5) protects not only good faith parties, but also those
who negotiated the check with knowledge of the forgery—including the forger
himself. It is submitted that this is not a satisfactory result and that the anti-
waiver provision of subsection (5) should be modified so as to limit its
protection to good faith parties. This could be done quite simply by inserting
the three words "in good faith" as suggested below:
(5) If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against
a claim or a customer upon or resulting from payment of an item and
waives or fails upon request to assert the defense the bank may not
assert against any collecting bank or other prior party presenting
or transferring the item [in good faith,] a claim based upon the
unauthorized signature or alteration giving rise to the customer's
claim.24
If the statute is thus amended, the desired effect of the anti-waiver provision
is in no way compromised, and a potentially dangerous side effect is elimi-
nated.
The anti-waiver provision as presently drafted applies only when the
customer has been negligent in his treatment of his bank statements. If the
customer has negligently provided the occasion for the forgery in some other
manner, the anti-waiver provision is not invoked to prevent the drawee from
shifting the loss from its negligent customer to a good faith transferor. It is
submitted that an anti-waiver provision should be equally applicable to these
other forms of negligence. This means simply that the modified anti-waiver
provision suggested above should be engrafted upon section 3-406. An even
more satisfactory solution would be to join sections 3-406 and 4-406 under
one general negligence section. It is clear that section 3-406 includes the
negligence described in detail by section 4-406. 25 Under section 3-406 any
party can raise the issue of a drawer's negligence in handling his bank state-
ments; section 4-406 describes in detail the drawee's rights to defend on this
ground. It is submitted that the present separation of these sections does not
serve any useful purpose; it does, however, produce the inconsistent and even
Corresponding Provisions of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 7 Hastings L.J.
1, 32-34 (1955).
23 U.C.C. § 3-417, Comment 3.
24 U.C.C. § 4-406(5).
25 U.C.C. § 3-406, Comment 7.
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capricious result discussed above.26 The substantive rights of several parties
are determined, not according to the material question of which party was
negligent, but rather according to the irrelevant question of what form the
negligence assumed.
STANLEY R. STEIN
26 See p. 99 supra.
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